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Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk
If every law were enforced with the same degree of accuracy as are the
revenue acts, it is probable that the courts would be swamped with cases
brought to it for adjudication. This thought is impressed upon us at this time,
upon contemplating the case of Frank K. Bowers, collector, v. Kerbaugh-Empire
Co., decided by the United States supreme court May 3, 1926.
It appears from a reading of this decision that Kerbaugh-Empire Company
engaged in the performance of large construction contracts, and during the
course of its work borrowed funds from the Deutsche Bank of Germany on
notes payable “as to principal and interest in marks or their equivalent in
United States gold coin at prime bankers’ rate in New York for cable transfers
to Berlin.” The amounts so borrowed were advanced to the corporation’s
subsidiary and were expended and lost in and about the performance of the
construction contracts. These losses were sustained in 1913, 1914, 1916, 1917
and 1918.
Payments were made on account of these notes payable from time to time,
and the final payment was made in 1921; the final payment being on the basis
of two and one-half cents a mark. Because of the diminution of the value of
the mark in 1921, it is apparent that the commissioner asserted that taxable
income had been realized to the extent to which the last payment was less
than the amount of the debt then outstanding, measured in the value of the
mark at date the debt was incurred.
From the foregoing brief outline it appears that even though this taxpayer
had sustained losses on account of the contracts which these marks were
borrowed to finance, there was some diminishment of this loss because of the
depreciation of the mark’s value in 1921, and that the commissioner considered
the difference between the former value and the 1921 value of the 1921 pay
ment as income in that year.
The court summed up the situation in the following language:
“The contention that the item in question is cash gain disregards the
fact that the borrowed money was lost and that the excess of such loss
over income was more than the amount borrowed. . . . The loss was less
than it would have been if marks had not declined in value; but the mere
diminution of loss is not gain, profit or income.”

It seems that this ruling is eminently just, and from the viewpoint of the
laity it is of the essence of common sense.
In order to obtain this favorable decision, the taxpayer was obliged to appeal
from the United States district court to the United States supreme court.
The amount of tax at issue was $5,198.77.
How much more lenient does the government seem in the enforcement of
its crime laws than in those dealing with federal taxes!
A responsible taxpayer of excellent repute recently received a jeopardy
assessment of a deficiency in advance of any information as to the manner in
which the commissioner had determined that there was such deficiency. The
taxpayer stayed payment of the assessment by furnishing a satisfactory bond.
In the course of a month he received the deficiency letter from the com
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missioner asserting additional income on an alleged sale of a certain corpora
tion’s stock. This taxpayer had never at any time owned, purchased Or sold
any of the said stock, and upon investigation he has reason to believe that
the commissioner confused him with another man of similar name whose
residence was distant from his, but in the same state.
The remedy available to this taxpayer is to petition the United States
board of tax appeals, and, when the time comes, to find some way in
accordance with the rules of evidence to prove to that body that he realized
no profit on the alleged transaction because he never owned, purchased or
sold any of the stock.
Here is a case in which the burden of proof should be upon the commissioner,
as his reason for asserting the deficiency is stated to be: “Upon information
furnished the commissioner” this taxpayer realized a profit not returned of
$. ... It is undoubtedly a case of mistaken identity, but that lamentable
error does not relieve the taxpayer of incurring considerable cost to prove that
there is an error.
Whether or not the Couzens committee accomplished anything of value is
a controversial point. One wonders, if a commission were appointed to inves
tigate the bureau of internal revenue in the interests of the taxpayers, whether
there would not be derived results of value not only to taxpayers but to the
government as well.
SUMMARY OF RECENT RULINGS
A loss is not deductible as arising from theft or other casualty which results
from damage to an automobile in the unauthorized possession of the chauffeur.
(United States district court, S. D. of New York, Shearer v. Anderson, collector.)
Corporate earnings of prior years credited on the corporate books to the
stockholders but not declared as a dividend constitute invested capital and not
borrowed capital.
A sale of real estate occurred and the profit thereon was taxable in 1919,
when made to solvent purchasers, there being delivered in that year $10,000
and a contract for payment of the remainder, $100,000, in June, 1920, when
title was to be transferred.
Invested capital at beginning of year was not decreased by a dividend de
clared March 27, 1918, if there were sufficient current earnings; otherwise ap
portionment must be made as provided in sec. 201 (e) of the 1918 act. (United
States district court of Kansas, second division, Davidson & Case Lumber Co.
v. Motter, collector.)
In a lease for 45 months for $100 a month and one-half of the net profits for
the first year and the board of an individual for that year, the total amount
must be spread over the entire period and an aliquot part may be deducted as
the rental expense each year. (United States district court, eastern division
of Louisiana, Galatoire Bros. v. Lines, collector.)
Reciprocal or inter-insurance exchanges in which automobile owners executed
an application and power of attorney, making a small deposit, agreeing to
indemnify ratably (there being no joint liability) automobile losses of others
entering into similar agreements, are not subject to capital-stock tax under the
1918 act, nor the income tax under section 10 of the 1916 act, or section 4 of the
1917 act, nor the tax on premiums under section 504 of the 1917 act and section
503 (c) of the 1918 act and similar provisions of the 1921 act. (United States
district court, S. D. of Illinois, Belt Automobile Indemnity Association v. United
States.)
An irrevocable transfer in trust, income to be paid to grantor during life,
right to occupancy reserved, principal to be paid to another upon her death, is
taxable as one to take effect at or after death. (Circuit court of appeals, 3rd
circuit, McCaughn, collector, v. Girard Trust Co., executor.)
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Dividends are taxable which are made from corporate earnings accumulated
since February 28, 1913, without regard to stock dividends, as the latter arc
not corporate distributions. (Circuit court of appeals, 5th circuit, Walker et
ux. v. Hopkins, collector.)
New York transfer taxes paid by the executor are legal deductions from gross
income of decedent’s estate. (United States supreme court, Keith, late col
lector, v. Emma B. Johnson, administratrix.)
Where accounts are kept on a cash basis and clearly reflect the income, estate
taxes paid in 1920, although due in 1919, may be deducted from 1920 gross
estate income, and not from 1919 income.
Texas inheritance taxes paid in 1919 are legal deductions from gross income
of decedent’s estate for that year. (United States supreme court, United
States v. John Mitchell et al., executors.)
Waiver executed by president and secretary of corporate directors not ob
jected to by other directors is sufficient, especially when corporation is benefited
thereby.
Held under the facts, cost is basis for valuing inventory in manufacturing
business, and market value may not be adopted if higher than cost. (Circuit
court of appeals, fifth circuit, United States v. J. A. Kemp, et al.)
A corporation may deduct as business expenses for 1918 salaries of its prin
cipal officers . . . where there is uncontradicted evidence that such salaries
were reasonable and usual for the services performed, although the amount of
stock held by each officer was considered. (United States district court, E. D.
of Louisiana, New Orleans division, United States v. George R. Rutmeyer, et al.)
Section II G (a) and (b) of the 1913 act for the non-inclusion in gross income
of the portion of premiums received by life-insurance companies paid back or
credited to individual policy-holders does not authorize the exclusion of divi
dends paid or credited to a class, payment to be made to survivors thereof
whose policies are in force at the end of their policy periods.
A reserve fund set up because of a premium at which bonds were purchased
may not be deducted as a “loss actually sustained during the year” as the
result can not be known until the bonds are sold or paid.
Amount of premium liability waived on insured’s disability may not be
deducted as an addition required by law to reserve funds when the state treated
it as a liability and not as a general reserve, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary.
A special fund required to be set aside by the superintendent of insurance to
meet losses on deaths unreported is not deductible as a reserve fund required
by law.
A fund set aside to pay annuities to former soliciting agents of an insurance
company, not constituting a reserve to meet maturing policies is not deductible
as a reserve. (United States supreme court, New York Life Insurance Co., v.
Edwards, collector.)
Suit for additional estate taxes may be maintained and a personal judgment
therefor had against the executors, and all the net estate upon which the lien
exists may be levied upon and sold to satisfy the judgment, without precedent
assessment. (Circuit court of appeals, first circuit, United States v. James C.
Ayer, et al., executors.)
In a trial for conspiracy with relation to a false corporate return, no search or
seizure or compelling defendant to testify against himself, in violation of the
fourth and fifth amendment to the constitution, is shown by the use of records,
access to which had been allowed.
The overt act of subscribing and swearing to return is proven where the
notary testifies he recognized the signatures and executed the jurats in accord
ance with custom, the papers being left on his desk for that purpose.
In a trial for conspiracy as to false corporate returns, books of the corpora
tion are admissible where the individuals charged are officers, and books are
properly authenticated which were submitted to verify the returns.
Where property burned is deducted from inventory, the insurance received
stands in its place and should be returned in determining excess profits. (Cir
cuit court of appeals, eighth circuit, William F. and Austin A. Cooper v. United
States.)
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Where notes payable in German marks, or in the gold equivalent, given for
money borrowed, were paid with but a fraction of the money borrowed, because
of depreciation, there was no taxable income, and the money borrowed having
been lost, the mere diminution of such loss did not constitute income. (United
States supreme court, Bowers, collector, v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co.)
TREASURY RULINGS
(T. D. 3839, March 20, 1926)

Article 23: Bases of computation.
Income tax—Revenue act of 1916—Decision of supreme court.

1. Deductions—Munitions Manufacturer’s Tax.

Where a taxpayer keeps its accounts upon an accrual basis and sets
up a reserve during the year 1916 for the munitions manufacturer’s tax
levied by the revenue act of 1916, the munitions tax should be taken
as a deduction in the income-tax return for the year 1916, as “ac
crued,” and not in the return for the year 1917 when the tax was
“paid.”
2. Statutory Construction—Accounts—Returns—Accrual.
Section 12(a) of the revenue act of 1916 provides for the keeping
of books and the filing of returns upon a receipts-and-disbursements
basis, and section 13(d) of the act provides for the keeping of books
and the filing of returns upon an accrual basis unless the latter does
not reflect true net income. Under section 13(d), taxpayers must file
their returns upon an accrual basis in accordance with their method
of bookkeeping, and may not file returns upon a mixed basis of re
ceipts and disbursements as to some items and accrual as to other
items, as such a return would not reflect true net income. Treasury
decision 2433, interpreting section 13(d), was in conformity with the
purpose and intent of the law.

3. Same.
Under sections 12(a) and 13(d) of the revenue act of 1916, a cor
poration which made its tax return and kept its books of account
on an accrual basis by deducting from gross income all losses and
expenses accruing during year and applicable to process of earning
income, whether immediately payable or not, was required to deduct
such items, including a reserve for taxes, in the year of accrual rather
than when paid in order to reflect true income.

4. Evidence—Findings

of

Fact—Burden of Proof.

Findings of the court of claims that a corporation kept its books and
made its returns on basis of accruals and reserves to meet liabilities
instead of a receipts-and-disbursements basis is conclusive on supreme
court, and the burden of proof is upon the taxpayer seeking to recover
the tax to prove facts establishing the invalidity of the tax.

5. Decision Distinguished.
The case of United States v. Woodward (256 U. S., 632; T. D. 3195
[C. B. 4, 153]) distinguished.
The following decision of the United States supreme court in the cases of
United States v. P. Chauncey Anderson et al., etc., and United States v. The
Yale & Towne Manufacturing Co. is published for the information of internalrevenue officers and others concerned.
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Supreme Court of the United States
337. The United States, appellant, v. P. Chauncey Anderson, Lowell L. Richards,
C. A. Richards, et al., etc.
420. The United States, appellant, v. The Yale & Towne Manufacturing Co.
[January 4, 1926.]
Mr. Justice Stone delivered the opinion of the court.
The appellees in both cases brought suit in the court of claims to recover
payments of corporate income taxes alleged to have been erroneously exacted.
From judgments in their favor the government brings the cases to this court
on appeal. Judicial Code, section 242, before amendment of 1925.
For the purpose of discussing the main question raised by both appeals,
No. 420 will first be considered, and such additional questions as are involved
in No. 337 will then be taken up.
The appellee, Yale & Towne Manufacturing Co., a Connecticut corporation,
was, in 1916, engaged in the manufacture of munitions. The tax imposed by
the United States on the profits on munitions manufactured by it and sold
during that year became due and was paid in 1917. In making its return
for income tax for the year 1917, the appellee deducted from its gross income
the amount of the munitions tax thus paid. Later the commissioner of
internal revenue held that the munitions tax paid in 1917 should have been
deducted from the appellee’s gross income in its return for 1916. There was
in consequence an adjustment of the income taxes payable in those years,
resulting in a net increase of the tax payable for the year 1917 of $116,044.40,
which was assessed and paid under protest and is the amount for which suit
was brought.
The correctness of the determination of the commissioner depends upon the
construction of the revenue act of 1916 and its application to the particular
method employed by the taxpayer in keeping its books of account and in
making return for income tax for 1916. The pertinent provisions of the statute
are sections 10, 12(a), 13 (a) and (d), and 300 of the revenue act of 1916
(ch. 463, 39 Stat., 756, 765, 767-768, 770-771, 780-781). The act imposes a
tax on net income and profits ascertained as provided by section 12(a), by de
ducting from gross income expenses paid, losses sustained, interest and taxes
paid during the calendar year. Section 13(d), however, provides that—
“a corporation . . . keeping accounts upon any basis other than that of
actual receipts and disbursements, unless such other basis does not clearly
reflect its income, may, subject to regulations made by the commissioner of
internal revenue, with the approval of the secretary of the treasury, make
its return upon the basis upon which its accounts are kept, in which case the
tax shall be computed upon its income as so returned. ...”
In the year 1916 the appellee set up on its books of account all the obligations
or expenses incurred during the year, whether they fell due and whether they
were paid during that year. It entered in an account, “reserves for taxes,”
items of various kinds of taxes, liability for which was incurred by reason of
its operations for that year, whether paid or payable during the year. Included
in the reserves for taxes for 1916 were items aggregating $247,763.19 for taxes
on profits from the sale of munitions during the year. The return for the
munitions tax was made by the appellee in 1917, and the tax, after revision
and an additional assessment, was paid in 1917, the year when it was due.
In making up its income-tax return for 1916, appellee deducted from gross
income all the items appearing on its books as losses sustained and obligations
and expenses incurred during the year, except that it omitted from the return
the items of munitions tax, likewise carried on its books, as an obligation or
expense incurred or accrued in the year.
It is urged by the government that the appellee, not having kept its books or
made its tax return on the basis of receipts and disbursements, has elected to
avail itself of the privilege afforded by section 13(d) of making its return on
what was referred to in the briefs and argument as “the accrual basis”; that
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having so elected, it is required consistently to deduct from gross income all
items appearing on its books as expenses accruing or incurred during the
taxable year, including its reserve for munitions taxes, whether payable or not.
It is not denied by the appellee that its method of keeping its accounts and
setting up a reserve for munitions taxes reflected its true income for 1916 or
that its amended return on that basis accurately reflects its income and profits
for the year. But it contends that the munitions tax was deductible only in
1917 because under the revenue act of 1916 only taxes actually paid during
the year were deductible in determining net income for the year; and that in
any case the provisions of that act and the regulations made by the commis
sioner, authorizing the taxpayer to make his returns on an accrual basis if
his books are so kept, could have no application to tax deductions, since a tax
does not accrue until it is due and payable.
While section 12(a) taken by itself would appear to require the income-tax
return to be made on the basis of actual receipts and disbursements, it is to be
read with section 13(d), which we have quoted and which obviously limits in
some respects the operation of section 12(a) by providing in substance that a
corporation keeping its books on a basis other than receipts and disbursements
may make its return on that basis, provided it is one which reflects income.
Standing by themselves and taken at their face value, these sections would
seem to require the taxpayer to make his return on the. basis of receipts and
disbursements, or, in the alternative, on the basis of its own books of account
if they reflect true income, under such regulations as the commissioner may
make, and indeed to require the latter alternative if the taxpayer is unable to
make his return on that basis.
So interpreting the statute, the commissioner, with the approval of the
secretary of the treasury, on January 8, 1917, before appellee made its incometax return for 1916, promulgated treasury decision 2433, which provides
in part that under section 13(d) it “will be permissible for corporations which
accrue on their books monthly or at other stated periods amounts sufficient
to meet fixed annual or other charges to deduct from their gross income the
amounts so accrued, provided such accruals approximate as nearly as pos
sible the actual liabilities for which the accruals are made, and provided
that in cases wherein deductions are made on the accrual basis, as hereinbefore
indicated, income from fixed and determinable sources accruing to the corpora
tions must be returned, for the purpose of the tax, on the same basis.”
It also provided in substance that when the taxpayer, following a con
sistent accounting practice, sets up reserve to meet liabilities, the “amount
of which or date of maturity” is not definitely determinable, such reserve
may be deducted from gross income. The decision also laid down a pro
cedure for readjusting such reserves when the amount actually required for
that purpose was definitely ascertained, and provided that if returns upon
this basis of “accrual or reserves” did not reflect true net income, the tax
payer would not be permitted to make its return on any other basis than that
of “actual receipts and disbursements.”
We think that the statute was correctly interpreted by the commissioner
and that his decision referred to was consistent with its purpose and intent.
The revenue acts of 1909 and 1913 authorized a method of computing the
income of corporations which did not differ materially from that provided
by section 12(a) of the act of 1916. They required in terms that net in
come should be ascertained by deducting from gross income received interest,
expenses and taxes actually paid, and losses actually sustained, but con
tained no provision corresponding to section 13(d) of the act of 1916, by which
a return might be made on the basis of the taxpayer’s books of account. (Cor
poration excise tax, act of August 5, 1909, ch. 6, sec. 38, 36 Stat., 11, 112;
corporation income tax, act of October 3, 1913, ch. 16, Sec. II, subdiv. G. 38
Stat., 114, 172.)
It was pressed upon us in argument by appellees that it was found im
practicable to comply strictly with the requirements of the 1909 and 1913 acts
for computing income on the basis of receipts and disbursements and that
under both acts the administrative practice was established, by appropriate
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treasury regulations, permitting the use of inventories and authorizing de
duction of expenses constituting a liability of the taxpayer, whether paid or
not, in ascertaining net income, but that those regulations did not permit the
deduction of taxes except in the year when paid. From this it is argued that
congress, by re-enacting in section 12(a) of the act of 1916 the corresponding
provisions of the earlier acts, adopted the settled administrative practice,
and that accordingly under that act, as well as under the earlier acts and
treasury regulations, taxes could be deducted only in the year when paid.
This argument would have force had congress stopped with the enactment
of section 12(a). By thus adopting, without material change, the correspond
ing provisions of earlier acts, congress might have been deemed to have recog
nized and adopted the established practice of the department interpreting and
applying them. (National Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U. S., 140.) But, in
the act of 1916, congress added section 13(d), which did not have its counterpart
in earlier legislation. This section went further than any previous regulation
by authorizing the tax return to be made on the basis on which the taxpayer’s
books were kept, provided only that the basis was one reflecting income and the
return complied with regulations made by the commissioner.
Treasury decision 2433, to which reference has been made, was in harmony
with this view of section 13(d). It recognized the right of the corporation to
deduct all accruals and reserves, without distinction, made on its books to
meet liabilities, provided the return included income accrued and, as made,
reflected true net income. If the return failed so to reflect income, the regu
lation reserved the right of the commissioner to require the return to be made
on the basis of receipts and disbursements.
A consideration of the difficulties involved in the preparation of an income
account on a strict basis of receipts and disbursements for a business of any
complexity, which had been experienced in the application of the acts of 1909
and 1913 and which made it necessary to authorize by departmental regulation
a method of preparing returns not in terms provided for by those statutes,
indicates with no uncertainty the purpose of sections 12(a) and 13(d) of the
act of 1916. It was to enable taxpayers to keep their books and make their re
turns according to scientific accounting principles, by charging against income
earned during the taxable period the expenses incurred in and properly attrib
utable to the process of earning income during that period; and, indeed, to re
quire the tax return to be made on that basis, if the taxpayer failed or was
unable to make the return on a strict receipts and disbursements basis.
The appellee’s true income for the year 1916 could not have been determined
without deducting from its gross income for the year the total cost and expenses
attributable to the production of that income during the year. The reserve for
munitions taxes set up on its books for 1916 must have been deducted from
receivables for munitions sold in that year before the net results of the opera
tions for the year could be ascertained. The taxpayer being unable to make
its return on a strict receipts-and-disbursements basis, and not having at
tempted to do so, could not have complied with section 13(d) and treasury de
cision 2433 by deducting either accruals of interest or expenses alone without
the other, or without deducting other reserves made on its books to meet
liabilities such as the munitions tax, incurred in the process of creating income.
Only a word need be said with reference to the contention that the tax upon
munitions manufactured and sold in 1916 did not accrue until 1917. In a
technical legal sense it may be argued that a tax does not accrue until it has
been assessed and becomes due; but it is also true that in advance of the
assessment of a tax all the events may occur which fix the amount of the tax
and determine the liability of the taxpayer to pay it. In this respect, for
purposes of accounting and of ascertaining true income for a given accounting
period, the munitions tax here in question did not stand on any different foot
ing than other accrued expenses appearing on appellee’s books. In the eco
nomic and bookkeeping sense with which the statute and treasury decision
were concerned, the taxes had accrued. It should be noted that section 13(d)
makes no use of the words “accrue” or “accrual,” but merely provides for a
return upon the basis upon which the taxpayer’s accounts are kept, if it re
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fleets income—which is precisely the return insisted upon by the government.
We do not think that the treasury decision contemplated a return on any
other basis when it used the terms “accrued” and “accrual” and provided for
the deduction by the taxpayer of items “accrued on their books.”
United States v. Woodward (256 U. S., 632 [C. B. 4, 153], relied upon by
appellees, arose under the income-tax law of 1918 (ch. 18, title II, secs. 210-214,
219, 1405, 40 Stat., 1062-1067, 1071, 1151). Section 213 (a) and (e) of that
act provided that taxes “paid or accrued” within the taxable year imposed
by authority of the United States except income, war-profits, and excess-profits
taxes, might be deducted in ascertaining income. The claim of the taxpayer
of the right to deduct estate taxes levied under that act for the year when due,
although paid in a later year, was upheld. It did not appear whether, as here,
the taxpayer kept his books on the accrual basis or whether, as here, events
had occurred before the tax became due which fixed the amount of it; for it
did not appear whether the deductions to be made from the testator’s gross
estate were ascertainable for the purpose of determining the estate tax. The
question which we now have to determine was not raised, considered, or decided
in that case.
We conclude that the reserves for taxes which appeared on appellee’s books
in 1916 were deductible under section 13(d) of the act of 1916 and treasury
decision 2433 in its income-tax return on the accrual basis for that year.
It was argued in behalf of the appellees in No. 337 that the taxpayer did not
keep its books on an accrual basis; that consequently its case was not con
trolled by section 13(d) and treasury regulations made under it, and that by
section 12(a) it was authorized to deduct the amount assessed for munitions
taxes only in 1917, the year when paid. On this point we are concluded by the
findings. They show that in the year 1916 the taxpayer accrued on its books
expenses, whether paid or not, including “insurance reserves,” “freight re
serves,” “bonus reserves," and depreciation charged off, aggregating more than
two and a half million dollars, which it deducted from accrued gross income,
whether actually received or not, in making its income-tax return for the year.
It charged on its books and deducted in its income-tax return interest accrued
and paid during the year. So far as appears no other interest accrued during
the year and there was no reserve for interest. No charge or deduction was
made for bad debts. It also set up on its books for that year a monthly
reserve of $35,000 for the payment of munitions taxes beginning with Sep
tember, the month of the passage of the revenue act of 1916 taxing munitions.
On December 31, 1916, this reserve account was closed out and a charge was
made on its books against the corporate surplus for account of munitions taxes
of $86,541.95. No deduction was made by the taxpayer for munitions taxes in
its income-tax return for the year 1916. In 1917 the munitions tax was re
turned and ultimately assessed and paid in the sum of $112,419.54.
Since the suit was one to recover a tax erroneously exacted, the burden was
on the petitioners, appellees here, to prove the facts establishing the invalidity
of the tax. But the findings fail to show affirmatively that the books were
kept or the return made on the basis of receipts and disbursements. Indeed,
the facts found, to which we have referred, show that the books were kept on
the basis of accruals and reserves to meet liabilities incurred. It does not
appear that there was any expense or liability of the taxpayer incurred by its
operations during the year which was not accrued on its books. Its return
was made on that basis, but omitted munitions taxes accrued on its books
during the year for which the return was made. We think these facts bring
the case clearly within the principle which we deem to be applicable to No. 420.
The judgment of the court of claims in each case is reversed.
Mr. Justice Sutherland and Mr. Justice Sanford dissent.
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